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F o o d  S e c u r it y  A n d  T h e  M u e d a  Pl a t e a u : U r b a n  P h y s ic a l  S u p p l y  - R u r a l
In c o m e  E n t it l e m e n t s
( N o t e s  b y  R. H. G r e e n )
1. There are prior references to this issue in SSPA minutes. The main substance follows: It 
raises a number of more general issues.
2. The Mueda Plateau is relatively fertile land with relatively assured rainfall. Therefore, like 
Angonia, it is a national breadbasket. It has been a grain exporting area since the 1950's 
and probably the 1930's. Pre independence production for sale was mixed - colon, African 
predominately the latter in 1960's-1970's. Grain purchase and return sale of merchandise 
was by itinerantes - colon traders with a lorry who travelled out from warehouse/shop in 
Mueda, Moicimba or smaller towns to buy produce/sell goods. The main markets were 
Beira (and sometimes Maputo) by sea and Pemba (earlier by sea, later by road).
3. Moicimba was (is) the nearest port to the Plateau and was (is) connected to it by a good 
road. It has a fair harbour. The quay, however, is only able to handle 500 tonne (?) 
vessels. It is now used by the log trade. Grain (plus cement, fertiliser, general cargo) was 
lightered (flat bottom self propelled, snub nosed, shallow draught, open vessels like small 
barges) out to 1,000 to 1,500 tonne cabotage vessels.
4. The system was weakened before independence (the plateau was a war zone) and more so 
at independence (the itinerantes literally drove off into the sunset in their lorries leaving a 
very limited number of, largely Indian ancestry, merchants. Some of cabotage vessels 
sailed off to the south, port maintenance declined). But the full breakdown comes at some 
time in 1983-1985 period:
a. lighters went out of operation - engines worn out;
b. Navique's cabotage service became increasingly unreliable;
c. Road to Pemba was cut (near Pemba) isolating Plateau from bank credit (only 
branches able to authorise loans are in Pemba) and from govemment/empressa agents 
who sat in offices (or on beaches) in Pemba which over 1985-1991 was virtually an 
enclave accessible only by sea (or light plane which Provincial administration, let alone 
banks, did not use to maintain contact with Mueda).
5. Since 1989 I have tried to reinterest Ministries in Mueda. (Saude an honourable exception 
together with Agua - they kept postos/centros, some rural water projects going.) In one 
sense an 'easy' rural area once there - Renamo never had much of a presence on plateau
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and never cut off link to Moicimba.) This had some impact e.g. first Agricultura national 
director visit in 4 years and came back enthusiastic, renewed EU visits. But transport 
problems because clear especially for commerce/small farming household market access.
6. There are three basic problems:
a. working capital (logically bank credit) to crop buyers (especially merchant 
transporters). At least at farm or village collection levels, Agricon cannot compete 
with goods out/produce back operators who are full both out and in and have two set 
of business to earn margins whereas Agricon goes out empty and has only grain buying 
margins. Snags here are: a) Mueda, Moicimba have bank branches but so poorly 
staffed they are not allowed to make loans; b) BCM and BPD are so scared of more 
bad debts they are very hesitant about lending (no S-T branch even in Pemba);
b. limited lorries on Plateau or in Moicimba. Public and private sector fleets in Pemba 
but concentrate on Pemba/Plateau and Pemba/Nacala, Pemba/Nampula highways not 
Mueda/Moicimba let alone small road retail business. Merchants need to be able to get 
back out to villages. They physically lack lorries and, in most cases, cash or access to 
term credit to buy them. (The road is open and usable - not ideal condition.)
c. 110 functioning port at Moicimba. The lighters remain (at least until 1995) defunct. 
The quay is too shallow for economic size vessels for grain. The cabotage service of
1,000-1,500 class is also an historic memory (nearly inevitably with no lighters albeit 
whole coastal fleet is now too few).
7. As a result potential 50,000-75,000 tonne Plateau maize surplus rots in fields, moulds or 
feeds borer beetles in warehouses or is not planted while we beg for food aid for cities.
And small farming family sector (outside cashew areas) is deeply impoverished because it 
has no buyers for its potential maize surplus. And commercial sector not very dynamic (or 
large - new people don't come in) because low crop sales by households mean low sales to 
them by merchants and combined low turnover limits profits.
8. What is to be done? This case is one in which historic memory and analysis really do 
give a first draft for a prioritised action agenda which is - at the very least - a print out for 
articulating a coordinated action programme.
a. reactivate Moicimba. They key to that is lighters. If they are 10 tonne ones, for 
100,000 to 150,000 tonnes cargo a year and 4 round trips a lighter a day need 13 to 15 
( 4 x 1 0  tonnes x 300 days = 12,000 tonnes a year per lighter). Those numbers need to 
be checked but there is a Small Ports Authority with a Portmaster on spot who can do 
it (should have done so long ago.) Similarly design and size need to be thought out
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(what Portuguese used in 1950's-1970's may or may not be suitable vintage now).
With a clear set of specifications some donor (Nordic? Canada? Netherlands?) should 
be convincible. Including some light cranes, warehouse repair, etc. the order to 
magnitude of cost may be $2 million (could be less). If cargo 100,000 tonnes could be 
port revenue on it of $1 million plus a year.
9. Ensure cabotage service exists once port is able to handle it. From Berbera/Aden through 
Mtwara and from Durban through Walvis Bay there are viable cabotage operations which 
do serve minor ports. These range from modest size companies with 10 or so fairly 
modern 1,000 to 2,500 tonne vessels to old 500 to 1,000 tonne one vessel family 
enterprises. Basic cargoes - grain, charcoal, cement, drums of fuel, roofing sheet, 
fertiliser, general consumer goods. All private (expect perhaps Safmarine in South Africa 
and a fairly small passenger oriented line Dar-Mafia-Kilwa-Lindi-Mtwara and a Zanzibar- 
Dar one). There was a Mozambique parallel. Today there is much less service and largely 
Maputo-Inhambane-Beira-Quelimane-Nacala-Pemba which are main and middle ports.
Ending Navique monopoly hasn't brought a wave of new entrants - in many cases (e.g. 
Moicimba) because port facilities are inadequate and/or slow rehabilitation suggests there 
is little demand. However, also no hire purchase - term credit - "leasing" facilities 
accessible to entrants. A small used but serviceable cabotage ship might cost $250,000 
and a larger new one $2.5 million. (I believe good condition used would be best entry 
route for small/medium enterprise. Source for Mombassa and Dar seems to be Europe. 
North Sea and Baltic coasters are designed for shallow water and bad weather so probably 
technically suitable and can sail out via Mediterranean.)
10. The next step - if this checklist proves broadly correct - is to see why no action (or not 
effective) to data and who needs to act, how. ((I've written above in varying degrees of 
completeness in Minutes/Memos since 1990. Probably has bogged down - until end of 
war for more urgent concerns and even now Mueda is a small and faraway place viewed 
from Maputo or even from Pemba and inertia is a terrible foe. For example, Agricon 
worries about how it could buy grain and cost of road transport via Pemba from monopoly 
buying and emergencia inward shipment days. Tunnel vision and an historic memory tied 
to a brief atypical period can be very debilitating!
11. Who can do what - and might wish to do so?
a. merchants/transporters have interest in buying - moving grain if i)
economic/dependable transport; ii) business to be done; iii) hire purchase facilities to 
finance transport equipment and overdraft for purchasing/selling operations.
3
b. Small Ports Authority (unlike predecessor monolithic Railways and Harbours or even 
its Harbours Division which lived and died politically and economically on Maputo- 
Beira, could be helped or hurt by Nacala-Inhambane-Quelimane-Pemba and found 
minor ports an unrewarding headache) has good reason to wish to see Moicimba (and 
others, e.g. Xai Xai, Inharrime) thrive. They are its only business so it lives (or dies) 
on their success (or failure).
c. Provincial and District Administrations (Pemba-Mueda-Moicimba) want 
prosperous (or at least less poor) people - genuine concern for people, ease of 
administration, tax revenue, successes for their records to win promotion, etc. For the 
too Muedas matters.
d. Members of Parliament from Mueda-Moicimba (and probably all from Cabo 
Delgado) care. Public service, helping own home village - extended family, winning 
next election, getting a fair share for their people (Cabo Delgado feels it led liberation 
from Massacre of Mueda on but has been marginalised in gains since independence 
which explains, otherwise surprisingly high, Renamo vote there). Their personal or 
party political concerns are not CNP's or UAP's business - their interest in making 
marketed output on plateau rise is very much UAP business because it makes them 
allies in struggle to reduce poverty. (Nobody involved in setting up GAPVU was 
thinking of elections. But with 70,000 households benefiting by then it probably was 
worth a seat or three! And why not - a government that serves its people better should 
earn reward of more support. There is nothing wrong in pointing out to a Minister 
how a good programme will also be good for him politically! Or of warning of 
political risks of not acting or acting in an unsound way, e.g. at time of 100% minibus 
fare increase I advised govt, under no circumstances to put itself in position of being 
responsible for fares or anger would turn on it then or later and also that costs of fuel 
and spares had risen massively over 18 months so rollback order would mean no 
vehicles on road. Also advised bottom line problem was wages. On the whole govt, 
response - a) halting violence; b) moral suasion for agreed partial, fare rollback; c) 
some minimum wages rises and a Christmas bonus was relevant and about the best: 
for poor people, for keeping urban passenger transport going, and for its own political 
future that was possible in a tightly constrained context.)
e. Provincial Planning in DNP and DPIanning in Cabo Delgado - PP needs more 
concrete projects with high visibility if successful to build up visibility and influence.
f. Those donors interested in leasing (USAID), financial sector diversification (EU), hire 
purchase (SIDA) who have studies to hand and are presumably interested in proposals 
on "how to" acceptable to govt. USAID seems to want a US leasing company with
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little southern experience, unclear what EU has done with its study (a Mike Faber- 
Jeanne Stephens-RHG product which did advocate hp to vehicles, plant and machinery 
and - 1 think - ships). SIDA has a Swedish company present in Mozambique as base 
with a Swedish financial firm as partner concept. What is needed is:
a. a commercial enterprise. Free standing or - perhaps - linked to a commercial 
enterprise selling vehicles, ships, plant and equipment;
b. private sector and probably 100% foreign at start - commitment to sell 49% to 
domestic buyers between 5th and 10th year;
c. a finance house owned or partner to put in professional/hp experienced manager 
and to train (in Mozambique and at overseas headquarters) Mozambicans for most 
professional posts by year 5;
d. ideally a Southern African financial enterprise with hp experience as partner 
(Standard Bank of SA via Standard - Totta would be obvious candidate but S-T 
has been interviewed - e.g. by ADB - and were uninterested).
g. non-donor development finance bodies - ADB has a mission on HP (wanted to use 
BPD but advised against by SSPA and the Emprego) and it is in CDC (Commonwealth 
Development Corporation) field. CDC could find the commercial operators and put 
up some equity plus some loan finance. ADB not optimal for finding operator - 
presumably would channel ADF (when it has some funds) credit to GOM to relend to 
enterprise.
h. Agricon (or successor) wants to be able to buy and ship grain and to make a profit on 
it or (I hope!) to see private sector doing so. In fact many merchants appear to prefer 
to buy retail locally and sell wholesale to Agricon at Mueda-Moicimba-Pemba. That is 
fine (or should be) with Agricon which has comparative advantage in knowing/linking 
to Nacala or Beira or Inhambane or Maputo market (Pemba and Quelimane could 
under all normal conditions be served from adjacent Districts) and no disadvantage in 
hiring cabotage space or chartering coaster to move wholesale shipment. More 
retailers to feed into it at wholesale is fine - for Agricon retail buying always likely to 
be a tin of scorpions.
i. World Bank if only because it feels it is godfather and protector to UAP and really 
does believe in PPP and has some desire to see growth - private sector- pure 
households livelihood links build up. Can be enemy if not in picture and useful pusher 
of bilaterals if brought on board.
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12. UAP - since there is a poor Mueda Plateau household and a food security basis - has locus 
standi to be a catalyst. Next step is for UAP to plan what to do (including seeing 
everybody noted in 11 and seeking to get them on board) after securing approval at ND - 
and probably VM, perhaps M - level. Then organise coalition and get agreement who co­
ordinates/pushes ahead. Or who on what - Small Ports could lead on harbour but 
somebody in finance or DNP (including UAP) has to hunt down issues on ships-lorries-hp.
13. Good luck!
- R. H. Green 
Sometime SSPA 
Falmer March 1996
P.S. It may be worth checking whether any other surplus/potential surplus district have 
similar problems. Likely ones are upcountry district in Zambesia (e.g. Macuba) 
Northeast Tete (e.g. Angonia), perhaps lakeside Nyasa (e.g. Lichinga). These are all 
basically road haul areas so private sector may be able to act on own (Quelimane 
Harbour functions) but credit for buyers and hp for lorries may be relevant for some 
of them too. A fax backed by phone call to Provincial Planning Directors and District 
Governors would seem easiest way to get an initial local input and a look at Agricon's 
and Commerce's purchase figures (estimates) by District a potentially revealing desk 
check start in Maputo.
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